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Gambling on Proposition IA:
The California Indian
Self-Reliance Amendment
By K ALEXA KOENIG*
"We can't go back. The bridge is gone."
-Strong Eyes1
THE JOURNEY BACK towards tribal self-sufficiency has been long
and hard: For nearly two centuries, California Native American 2 tribes
have been forced off their lands, enslaved, and even systematically
murdered. 3 Their children have been taken from them, and their tri-
bal cultures devastated. 4 Even though American Indian reservations
continue to represent the nation's poorest communities, 5 tribal gov-
ernment gaming has revealed a new path, and now offers hope for an
easier future.6
* Class of 2003. The author would like to thank Professor John Adler for his
insightful suggestions, Lizabeth N. De Vries for her patient editing, Don West Mercer for
his understanding, and her family for their invaluable support. This Comment is dedicated
to her late grandfather, Frank Kirk, for teaching her to hold sacred her sense of justice,
and to her grandmother, Marion Kirk, for always looking at the world through empathetic
eyes.
1. As quoted by JoYcE SEQOUICHIE HIFLER, A CHEROKEE FEAsT OF DAYS 105 (Council
Oak Publishing Co. 1992).
2. "Native American" and "American Indian" are terms used interchangeably in this
Comment to refer to cultures indigenous to the United States. The term "Indian," alone, is
also used as defined in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3) (as "any person who is a member of an Indian
tribe") and in reference to terms of art such as "Indian Country."
3. See Michael Lombardi, Long Road Traveled I: From the Treaty of Temecula to the Pala
Compact, CAL. INDIAN GAMING NEWS, http://www.cniga.com/facts/history.php (last visited
Mar. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Lombardi I].
4. See Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2001).
5. See Status on Economic Impact of Indian Gaming, at http://indiangaming.org/
info/pr/statistics.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Economic Impact].
6. California is home to approximately 320,000 tribal members-more than any
other state in the nation. However, California Indians have less income, less education, less
land per capita, greater unemployment and higher poverty rates than non-California Indi-
ans. Additionally, although California Indians make up twelve percent of Indians nation-
wide, they receive less than one percent of all federal general assistance funds. See
California Indians Past and Present, Alliance of California Tribes Website, at http://www.
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"Indian gaming may not be the best thing in the world, but it's
the only thing that seems to work."7 While gambling may be consid-
ered a vice by some, no other means of economic development has
proven as fruitful for overcoming the extreme poverty of the past. In-
dian government gaming generated $12.7 billion in 2001; the $9.7
billion generated in 2000 represented a more than two thousand per-
cent increase since the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 8 ("IGRA") was
passed in 1988. 9 At Foxwoods Resort Casino in Connecticut, the most
successful tribal casino in the nation, the October 2001 slot machine
win hit sixty-three million dollars.' 0 With New York,1 Arizona, 12
Texas, 13 and other states having recently passed or currently consider-
ing legislation to legalize tribal gaming, the total revenue generated
by Indian casinos is poised to explode, surpassing even these stagger-
ing figures. 14
In California, gaming has proven to be an invaluable resource for
tribal governments for more than a decade, producing unprece-
dented revenue to help tribes provide for their members.' 5 Tribes
allianceofcatribes.org/californiaindians.htm (last visitedJune 29, 2002). Consequently, the
income generated by tribal casinos has the potential to make a greater proportional impact
in California than anywhere else in the nation.
7. James May, California Indian Gaming Issues and Politics-Part 3 of 3, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY (Mar. 26, 2002), http://indiancountry.com/?1017148100 (last visited Mar. 26,
2002) [hereinafter Issues and Politics] (quoting an anonymous Washington, D.C. tribal
attorney).
8. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2001).
9. See Cong. Testimony, 2001 WL 21757797,July 25, 2001. Today, well over two hun-
dred tribes in twenty-nine states operate casinos. See Mike Adams, Niagara Falls Pulls for
Jackpot, SUNSPOT.NET MARYLAND'S ONLINE COMMUNITY, May 28, 2002, at http://www.sun-
spot.net/news/nationworld/balte.gamble28may28.story?collfal%2Dhome%2Dheadlines
(last visited June 1, 2002).
10. See Ann Baldelli, Slot Machines at Casinos Remain Hugely Successful, THE DAY (Con-
necticut) (Nov. 16, 2001), http://www.theday.com/news/ts-re.asp?NewsUID=15BD8F47-
396C-4570-9802-E66D28D29F8B (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
11. See Tony Batt, Casino Industry: Regulation of Gaming Suggested, LAS VEGAS REv.-J.
(Nov. 17, 2001), http://www.lvrj.com/cgi-bin/printable.cgi?/lvrj (last visited Nov. 17,
2001).
12. See Tom Zoellner, Tribes Gear Up for Casino Fight, ARIz. REPUBLIC (Nov. 14, 2001),
http://www.lvrj.com/lvrj-home/2001/Nov-1 7-Sat-2001/business/17463507.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 17, 2001).
13. See Gary Scharrer, Casino Backers Protest Cornyn Visit, EL PASo TIMES (Nov. 15,
2001), http://www.borderlandnews.com/stories/borderland/20011115-153165.shtml (last
visited Nov. 17, 2001).
14. Numerous states have recognized the fiscal benefits that tribal gaming can pro-
vide for state budgets. For example, New York legalized six new tribal casinos in October
2001 as part of a plan to help make up a nine billion dollar shortfall resulting from the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. See Batt, supra note 11.
15. See Batt, supra note 11.
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have used casino proceeds to install modern water, sewer, and power
lines-some obtaining these resources for the first time. Such pro-
ceeds have also helped generate the funds necessary to start other
businesses, thereby aiding in economic development and diversifica-
tion, and reducing tribes' dependency on gaming as a source of reve-
nue. 16 For tribes that have not elected to take part in gaming, or
whose lands are too far from urban centers to make gaming feasible,
revenue sharing agreements17 have reduced dependence on welfare,
and produced critical income to ensure basic provisions for tribal
members.' 8
Tribal casinos have also had a major impact on the communities
surrounding Indian reservations. They have generated millions of dol-
lars annually in federal taxes, contributed to tourism and related in-
dustries, and provided jobs (often in depressed areas) for thousands
of non-Indians. 19
Even though tribal gaming has blossomed into a multi-billion dol-
lar industry, far more is at stake than mere dollars: For many tribes,
gaming represents a critical means of affirming and exercising their
governmental sovereignty. It has also meant developing political
clout 20 and ensuring the self-sufficiency of their communities. 2'
16. See Ernest L. Stevens, Jr., Letter to the Editor, WALL STREET J., May 17, 2002, http://
www.pechanga.net/press-release/national-indian-gaming-.assoc2.htm (last visited May
19, 2002) ("Indian gaming rebuilds Indian Communities, creates full time jobs with bene-
fits, reduces welfare ... Nationwide, gaming has established 300,000 jobs, generated over
$3.5 billion in federal taxes and revenue savings, and generated over one billion dollars in
state and local taxes."). The letter also asserts that the Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians in
Southern California has used casino profits to "[build] a tribal school, [fund] a college
scholarship program, [establish] fire, police and emergency medicine services and [build]
a water reclamation and sewer system." See generally California Nations Indian Gaming Asso-
ciation Website, at http://www.cniga.com/overview/index.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2002).
17. Revenue sharing programs pool funds from the net winnings of gaming tribes,
and then distribute the proceeds to non-gaming tribes to help with tribal sustenance and
economic development. See Tribal-State Gaming Compact § 4.3.2 (Sept. 10, 1999), available
at http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/tsc.doc (last visited May 26, 2002).
18. See Stevens, supra note 16. See also website, Yes on IA Basic Facts (clarifying that
such revenues are shared with non-gaming tribes to support these types of services) at
http://www.yesonla.net (last visited Nov. 18, 2001).
19. For example, tribal casinos in Riverside and San Bernardino Counties employed
more than 8800 people at the beginning of February 2002. The estimated annual payroll
for the five largest casinos in the region was one hundred and fifteen million dollars. See
Jack Katzanek, Economy: American Indian Tribes Already Employ Thousands and are AddingJobs,
PREss-ENTERPRISE (Feb. 24, 2002), at www.pe.com/cgi-bin/gold-print.cgi (last visited Feb.
24, 2002).
20. See May, Issues and Politics, supra note 7.
21. See Economic Impact, supra note 5. According to a recent survey, seventy-four per-
cent of Americans believe that "strengthening tribal self-government is a national political
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Nowhere has this been more true than in California. On March 7,
2000, the future of Indian gaming took a critical leap forward when
California citizens and tribes passed Proposition 1A.22 This proposi-
tion amended the California State Constitution,23 altering its anti-
gaming provisions to expressly authorize slot machines and other pre-
viously prohibited forms of gaming in tribal casinos. 24 Since the pro-
position's passage, sixty-two 2 5 of California's one hundred and nine
federally recognized tribes 26 have secured tribal-state compact agree-
ments that allow tribes to legally own and operate casinos on tribal
land.2 7
It is hard to overestimate the impact that the passage of Proposi-
tion IA has had and will continue to have in California and across the
nation. California's approach toward tribal gaming and the compacts
necessary to make such gaming legal provide one of two primary mod-
els for other states to follow as they define the scope of gambling
priority." See press release, PECHANGA.NET, at http://www.pechanga.net/press-release/sur-
veyjfindsamerican-people-su.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2002) (survey conducted Feb.
14-20, 2002).
22. See S. Res. 142, Proposed S. CONST. Amend. 11, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999)
(providing the full text of the proposition), available at http://primary2000.ss.ca.gov/Voter
Guide/Propositions/lAtext.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002).
23. See CAL. CONST., art. IV, § 19, cl. f (clause f added with the passage of Proposition
IA).
24. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), see discussion infra Part I.A., estab-
lished a classification system for tribal games, which ranges from Classes I-III. Slot ma-
chines are considered Class III gaming, which requires tribal-state agreements (or
"compacts"). See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(I)(C) (2001). See also
25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (2001) (defining Class III gaming). The compacts that were validated
by Proposition ]A's constitutional amendment are agreements between individual tribal
governments and the state of California, that define the scope of on-reservation gaming.
Such agreements are mandated by federal law, as necessary for the legal operation of "Las
Vegas style" (i.e. Class III) gambling on Indian lands. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C). See also
discussion infi'a Part I.A.
25. See California Gambling Control Commission Website, at http://www.cgcc.ca.
gov/tribalcasinos.shtml (last visited Sept. 5, 2002). (Forty-six tribal casinos are currently in
operation in California. Sixteen California tribes have signed compacts with the state but
not implemented gaming).
26. See California Indian Legal Services Website, at http://www.calindian.org/about
cils.htm (last visited June 23, 2002) (explaining that the organization is partially supported
by "California's 109 federally recognized Indian tribes").
27. While each tribe (as an independent sovereign domestic nation) has its own
agreement with California and thus there are many tribal-state compacts, reference is
made throughout this paper to the tribal-state compact. This singular indication references
the model agreement originally drafted by several tribes and the state, on which all of the
later, individual agreements were based. Tribal-State Gaming Compact, Sept. 10, 1999,
available at http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/tsc.doc (last visited May 26, 2002) [hereinafter Tribal-
State Gaming Compact].
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within their borders.28 Consequently, it is likely that much of the
country will scrutinize the impact of California's compacts as tribal
government gaming proliferates across the nation.
This Comment discusses the current and potential impact of the
Proposition IA constitutional amendment and its resultant compacts
on tribal governments and their surrounding communities. It also de-
tails and proposes solutions to five of the most urgent issues now fac-
ing tribes and the state as they work together to shape an effective
model for the future.
To place the importance of Proposition IA's passage in context,
Part I of this Comment summarizes the history of Indian gaming law
and its relationship to tribal sovereignty. Specifically, Part I focuses on
the roles of IGRA and the National Indian Gaming Commission 29
("NIGC"), which provide federal oversight for tribal gaming. It also
analyzes the practical impact of legal precedents including: Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida,30 which serves as an impediment to tribes
suing the states to enforce IGRA compliance; Proposition 5,31 the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court-doomed predecessor to Proposition IA; and
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union v. Davis,32
which held that the gaming authorized by Proposition 5 was unconsti-
tutional. Lastly, Part I evaluates the legality of Proposition IA and the
tribal-state compacts it secured.
Part II of this Comment analyzes the current state of tribal gam-
ing law in California and identifies five areas where the state has run
into difficulties implementing California's compact provisions. It dis-
cusses: 1) several text-based ambiguities, such as the maximum num-
ber of machines that can be operated by tribes; 2) the model
compact's renegotiation clauses and their potential impact on com-
pact permanency; 3) the monopoly and equal protection issues ar-
gued by anti-tribal gaming interests; 4) the legality of the tribal-state
compact's special distribution fund; and 5) concerns regarding how
28. See Zoellner, supra note 12 (describing how the California (or "first") approach
consists of tribes and the state jointly negotiating a model agreement that is then ratified
by voters, while the New Mexico (or "second") approach is comprised of the legislature
drafting a tribal gaming compact without tribal input).
29. See 25 U.S.C. § 2704 (West 2001) (establishing the NIGC). Further information on
the NIGC is available at www.nigc.gov (last visited Nov. 18, 2001).
30. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
31. See Proposition 5-Full Text of the Proposed Law, at http://Vote98.ss.ca.gov/
VoterGuide/Propositions/5.htm (last visited July 28, 2002).
32. 981 P.2d 990 (Cal. 1999).
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the boundaries of a reservation are currently defined, and how they
will be defined in the future.
Part III discusses potential approaches to resolving these issues,
emphasizing the importance of a speedy, effective, and final resolu-
tion for tribal governments and the state of California.
I. Background: Judicial and Statutory Notions of Tribal
Sovereignty
Although this Comment does not focus on the history of tribal
gaming, a general understanding of tribal law and Native American
history is critical to placing Proposition IA in context. It is important
to note that tribal-state relations have always filled a unique niche in
American law: as sovereign domestic nations, tribes have a complex
legal relationship with both state and federal governments.33 Conse-
quently, California tribes' potential for security-and in a few cases,
even prosperity-balances on a long and often-misunderstood
foundation. 34
A. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
In the mid-1980s, tribes across the country increasingly operated
bingo halls as a means of generating income. 35 In response, state and
county governments tried to hold such halls subject to their gaming
laws, 36 while tribes repeatedly asserted their sovereign immunity from
state and county regulation. 37 In a landmark 1987 case, the United
States Supreme Court sided with the tribes, holding that states and
counties were unjustified in their attempted regulation of Indian
bingo.3 8 This decision served as a strong judicial affirmation of tribal
self-governance, and offered hope for a new period of tribal govern-
ment recognition. However, because states were dissatisfied with the
33. See, e.g., Hotel Employees, 981 P.2d at 1014 (Kennard, J., dissenting). See also 25
U.S.C. § 1901 (acknowledging the "special relationship" that exists between the United
States and tribal governments). Understanding this relationship is especially critical con-
sidering that "the lives of Indians are impacted by law more pervasively than are the lives of
most other Americans." David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit
of States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 296 (2001).
34. See generally, Kevin K. Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, 1 Wyo. L.
REv. 427 (2002).
35. See website, Histoiy of IGRA, National Indian Gaming Commission ("NIGC"), at
http://www.nigc.gov (last visited June 30, 2002).
36. See id.
37. See id. Just like states cannot regulate one another but are subject to federal over-
sight, tribes are neither bound by the laws of the states or other tribal governments.
38. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
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holding and its rejection of external oversight, Congress quickly en-
acted IGRA, which provided for expanded federal regulation of tribal
gaming.3 9 Simultaneously, Congress created the NIGC as an indepen-
dent body to oversee IGRA compliance. 40
IGRA's primary function is to require that tribes establish com-
pacts4 1 with states before they operate certain kinds of games. 42 This
requirement helped make tribal gaming the most heavily regulated
form of gambling in the world.43 IGRA also categorized tribal games
into three classes: Class I includes "social games [with] prizes of mini-
mal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individ-
uals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or
celebrations."44 Class II games include bingo (whether electronic or
manual) and certain non-banked and non-electronic card games. 45
Class III is broadly defined as "all forms of gaming that are not Class I
gaming or Class II gaming. '46
Tribal governments and the United States federal government
enjoy varying and overlapping degrees of authority over the several
classifications. Class I games fall within the "exclusive jurisdiction of
the Indian tribes" 47 and are therefore exempt from state and federal
39. See website, National Indian Gaming Commission Home Page, at http://www.
nigc.gov (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
40. See id. The NIGC's stated mission includes regulating gaming on Indian lands in
order to protect tribes from "organized crime and other corrupting influences," confirm-
ing tribes are the primary beneficiaries of gaming income, and ensuring that both players
and operators conduct games "fairly and honestly."
41. Every Indian tribe that offers Class III gaming must have an individual agreement
or "compact" with the state in which they reside. The purpose of the compact is to "govern
the conduct of gaming activities." 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (3) (A). In California, a model tribal-
state compact was created through negotiations with Governor Gray Davis, prior to the
passage of Proposition IA. The model compact served as the foundation for each compact
later signed by individual tribes and the state. See Michael Lombardi, Long Road Traveled II:
Tribal Self-Sufficiency and the Battle for Proposition ]A, CAL. INDIAN GAMING NEWS, at http://
www.cniga.com/facts/history.php (last visited June 2, 2002) [hereinafter Lombardi II].
42. See Cynthia A. De Silva, Comment, Waging the Wager War: Tibal Sovereignty, Tribal
Gaming, and California's Proposition 5 and Chapter 409, 30 McGEORGE L. REV. 1025, 1053-55.
43. See id. at 1054-55 (1999). Gaming is monitored at the tribal level by tribal govern-
ment regulatory bodies. It is also regulated by state gaming departments, the FBI, the
NIGC, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the United States Department of Justice. See web-
site, California Nations Indian Gaming Association Questions and Answers, at http://www.
cniga.com/facts/qanda.php (last visited Apr. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Questions and
Answers].
44. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (2001).
45. See id. § 2703(7).
46. Id. § 2703(8). Class III games have traditionally included slot machines, and such
games as baccarat, craps, and blackjack. See Hotel Employees, 981 P.2d at 998.
47. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) (2001).
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regulation. 48 By contrast, Class II games, as mentioned above, are sub-
ject to both tribal jurisdiction and IGRA's general provisions, 49 while
Class III games are additionally subject to compacts that must be ne-
gotiated with states. 50 IGRA further mandates that Class III gaming
only be conducted "in a State that permits such gaming for any pur-
pose by any person, organization or entity,"5 1 meaning that tribes can
generally only offer types of gaming already allowed in the state. This
wording, however, is vague enough to have created significant legal
controversy. 52 For example, prior to the passage of Proposition IA,
California tribes argued that as soon as California enacted a state lot-
tery, and thereby introduced a form of Class III gaming into the state,
California tribes immediately became eligible to offer any kind of
Class III gaming on their reservations. The state, however, asserted
that tribes only became eligible to offer the same type of Class III gam-
ing as that already conducted in California-specifically, a lottery. 53
IGRA had provided a built-in protection against abuse of the in-
fringement on tribal sovereignty by requiring states to negotiate com-
pacts with tribes in good faith.54 However, the United States Supreme
Court subsequently found that requirement unconstitutional.
B. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida55
In the landmark case Seminole Tribe of Rorida v. Florida,56 the Su-
preme Court precluded tribes' ability to hold states to their end of the
IGRA agreement: to negotiate compacts if so requested. In Seminole,
the Court found that requiring states to negotiate with tribes violates
states' sovereignty under the United States Constitution's Eleventh
Amendment.57 This decision left tribes bound by IGRA, but pre-
cluded their ability to sue states for non-compliance. 58
Frustrated and angered by the betrayal, a handful of California
tribes began to expand their existing gaming establishments without
48. See id.
49. See id. § 2710(a) (2).
50. See id. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
51. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(B).
52. See, e.g., Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union v. Davis, 981 P.2d 990,
999-1000 (Cal. 1999) (where the California Supreme Court debated the scope of gaming
authorized by IGRA's text).
53. See id. at 999-1000.
54. See De Silva, supra note 42, at 1055-56.
55. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
56. See id.
57. See id. at 76.
58. See id. at 56.
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the IGRA-required compacts. 59 Although they continued to try to ini-
tiate negotiations with the state, the Seminole decision left them little
bargaining power.60 While IGRA allowed tribes to operate any type of
gaming already conducted in-state,61 the California Constitution (as
originally ratified in the nineteenth century) prohibited any form of
gambling (although later amendments authorized bingo62 and horse-
racing).63 Then, the creation of a California state lottery created an
even broader gaming possibility-and with it, even greater tribal-state
conflict.
6 4
Several tribes broadly interpreted IGRA as authorizing lottery-style
gaming devices that looked similar to California lottery keno ma-
chines. In turn, however, tribal gaming machines looked similar to
traditional slot machines, although they operated off a lottery-style
player pool system. 65 Consequently, the state characterized the tribes'
machines as having greater similarity to illegal Vegas-style slot ma-
chines than lottery terminals, thereby disagreeing with tribes that such
machines were permitted by IGRA.66 Tensions between California's
then-governor Pete Wilson and the tribes escalated: Tribes refused to
give up the extremely lucrative machines, and the governor refused to
negotiate compacts with tribes until they abandoned their new source
of revenue. 67
C. California's Proposition 5: The Tribal Government Gaming and
Economic Self-Sufficiency Act of 1998
Because California's chief executive refused to negotiate the
IGRA-required compacts and a judicial remedy had been foreclosed
59. See De Silva, supra note 42, at 1055.
60. See David B. Jordan, Note, Rolling the Dice on the Cyber-Reservation: The Confluence of
Internet Gaming and Federal Indian Law, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 455, 457 (2000).
61. See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (1) (B) (2001).
62. The operation of bingo is limited to charities.
63. See Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union v. Davis, 981 P.2d 990,
997-998 (Cal. 1999) (addressing the similarities between slot and lottery machines).
64. See discussion supra Part I.A.
65. In a player pool system, casinos charge a flat fee per play. For example, the house
may charge a player twenty-five cents each time she places a five dollar bet, regardless of
whether she wins or loses. Any money won by the player is made up of funds lost by previ-
ous players, from which the house takes nothing. By contrast, Las Vegas-style slot machines
offer "house banked" games, which enable the house to collect players' losses. See Hotel
Employees, 981 P.2d at 1016-19. The tribes' primary argument was that unlike Las Vegas
and New Jersey slot machines, their machines operated off a lottery-style player pool in
which the tribes had no economic interest in the outcome. See id. at 1001.
66. See Hotel Employees, 981 P.2d at 1016.
67. See De Silva, supra note 42, at 1065.
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with Seminole, the tribes turned to the state legislature for help.68 In
1998, in an unprecedented show of unity, 69 dozens of California tribes
came together in support of Proposition 5,70 an initiative aimed at
establishing a voter-backed model compact that would legalize their
electronic gaming machines. The proposition contained a default
provision that would trigger implementation of the Proposition 5
compact if the governor refused to negotiate individualized agree-
ments. 7' With their families' well-being and the functioning of their
governments at stake, the tribes dedicated millions of dollars to the
initiative. 72 The opposition of California gaming facilities and Nevada
casinos, which hoped to bar tribal competition, helped make the initi-
ative the most expensive non-presidential campaign in the history of
the United States.73 While the people of California overwhelmingly
passed Proposition 5,74 the outcome was immediately challenged by
its opponents in the courts.
D. Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union v.
Davis75
In Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union v.
Davis, tribal gaming opponents claimed Proposition 5 violated the
California state constitution, by allowing a prohibited form of gam-
bling.76 In his return to the plaintiffs' petitions, then-Governor Wilson
filed his support on behalf of plaintiffs and in opposition to the
68. See id. at 1070-74, 1080-81.
69. Tribes are distinct government entities, and as such, they have historically con-
flicted with one another over such inter-governmental issues as land and water rights, etc.,
just like other government bodies. Because tribes have been fiercely (and understandably)
protective of their individual, sovereign identities, as well as often isolated from one an-
other politically, financially and geographically, their coming together to pass Proposition
5 marked an historically unprecedented unity. This united front has been one of the major
elements credited for the successful passage of both Proposition 5 and Proposition 1A, as
well as compact negotiations with the state of California. See, e.g., May, Issues and Politics,
supra note 7.
70. SeeYes on IA Basic Facts Website, supra note 18.
71. See Hotel Employees, 981 P.2d at 1000-01. The default compact was triggered at the
end of a thirty day period if the governor did not open negotiations upon any tribe's
request.
72. See Lawsuit Threatens California Indian Gaming, ARIZ. CENTRAL (Nov. 16, 2001) (stat-
ing more than ninety million dollars was spent by Yes on Proposition 5 and its opposition),
at http://www.azcentral.com/archive (last visited June 29, 2002).
73. See id.
74. See id. See also Lombardi II, supra note 41. Sixty-three percent of voters' voted for
the proposition. See Questions and Answers, supra note 43.
75. 981 P.2d 990 (Cal. 1999).
76. See id. at 995.
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tribes. 77 However, in the same election that had passed Proposition 5,
the people of California had voted in a new governor, Gray Davis, who
consequently became the new real party at interest.78 One of Gover-
nor Davis's first tribal-related acts was to remove Wilson's support for
the plaintiffs, and file a new return that established the governor's
office as Proposition 5-neutral. 79
In a rare move, the California Supreme Court preempted Califor-
nia's lower courts from debating the proposition's constitutionality,8 0
declaring the questions underlying Hotel Employees of great public im-
portance and in need of urgent resolution.8 1 In its holding, the court
interpreted the state's gaming provisions narrowly, determining that
the proposition's authorization of electronic gaming machines con-
flicted with state constitutional law (which forbade "Las Vegas" style
gambling), and declared the Proposition 5 compact "invalid and inop-
erative."8 2 OnlyJustice Kennard dissented, reasoning that the proposi-
tion could not be unconstitutional since the people's initiative power
"must be liberally construed to promote the democratic process .... 83
She argued further that "[b)ecause federal law has preempted the
field of Indian gambling regulation, it is federal law, not state law, that
authorizes Indian gambling."8 4
In spite of the blow dealt by Hotel Employees, the governor recog-
nized that the public's landslide support of Proposition 5 demon-
strated a resounding approval of tribal gaming on tribal lands.
Consequently, Governor Davis agreed to negotiate with a majority of
the tribes to create a second model compact that could then be
presented to the voters for ratification in the form of a proposed con-
stitutional amendment.8 5 In exchange for a percent of tribal gaming
revenue,8 6 the governor offered tribes even more than what they had
sought with Proposition 5: Instead of offering a compact limited to
preserving tribes' lottery-style, player pool terminals, he agreed to al-
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 994.
83. Id. at 1011(Kennard, J., dissenting) (quoting Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309
(Cal. 1991)) (alteration in original).
84. Id. at 1012.
85. See Michael Lombardi, Long Road Traveled Il: California Indian Self Reliance and the
Battle for ]A, CAL. INDIAN GAmING NEWS, http://www.cniga.com/facts/history.php (last vis-
ited Mar. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Lombardi III].
86. See discussion infra Part II.D.
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low full Las Vegas-style slot machines, 87 as well as an exclusive right to
conduct Class III gaming in the state.88 The compact that emerged
from the negotiations ultimately formed the basis for Proposition IA,
a governor- and tribe-backed proposal to modify the California consti-
tution to legalize Class III tribal gaming on tribal lands.89
E. Proposition 1A
The passage of Proposition 1A on March 7, 2000 added the fol-
lowing language to the California State Constitution:
[T] he Governor is authorized to negotiate and conclude compacts,
subject to ratification by the Legislature, for the operation of slot
machines and for the conduct of lottery games and banking and
percentage card games by federally recognized Indian tribes on In-
dian lands in California in accordance with federal law. Accord-
ingly, slot machines, lottery games, and banking and percentage
card games are hereby permitted to be conducted and operated on
tribal lands subject to those compacts. 90
The effects of this amendment are only just now beginning to be
felt. In September 2001, Governor Davis appointed the last of five
members to California's Gambling Control Commission, a new regula-
tory body that, in tandem with tribal government agencies, will ensure
compliance with Proposition IA's tribal-state agreements. 91 The Com-
mission also recently dispersed the first twenty-five million dollars
from the compacts' revenue sharing fund to California's non-gaming
reservations. 92
87. See Hotel Employees, 981 P.2d at 999. Slot machines are consistently the biggest ca-
sino money-makers. Tribal slot machines can each generate net proceeds of more than
$100,000 per year. See Mike Geniella, Slots Pay Off Big for Indian Casinos, PRESS DEMOCRAT,
Jan. 2, 2002, www.pressdemocrat.com/local/news/02slots-bl.html (last visited Jan. 2,
2002).
88. See Tribal-State Gaming Compact, supra note 28, at Preamble § E.
89. See Lombardi II, supra note 41. See also CAL. CONST. of 1897, art. IV, § 19, cl. f.
(clause f added with the passage of Proposition 1A).
90. See CAL. CONST. of 1897, art. IV, § 19, cl. f (amended 2000). California voters ap-
proved the passage of Proposition IA by a landslide sixty-five percent. See Lombardi III,
supra note 85.
91. See James May, Gambling Control Commission Gets Senate Committee Support Not All
Tribes Concur, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Aug. 24, 2001), http://www.indiancountry.com/
?article=170 (last visited Sept. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Gambling Control Commission]. See also
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE ANALYSIS OF THE 2001-2002 BUDGET BILL, CALIFORNIA GAM-
BLING CONTROL COMMISSION (0885), F-43 (2001).
92. SeeJames May, Lawsuit Threatens Proposition LA, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Feb. 14,
2001), http://www.indiancountry.com/?article=444 (last visited Oct. 5, 2001) [hereinafter
Lawsuit].
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II. Problems with California's Current Tribal Gaming Law
The first steps taken toward implementing the tribal-state com-
pact have illuminated several problems regarding its interpretation
and implementation. It is critical these issues be clarified as soon as
possible through the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of
government-in tandem with tribes-to avoid the very litigation the
model compact was designed to circumscribe. It is especially impor-
tant that these issues be clarified prior to March 2003, when tribes and
the state become eligible to renegotiate the terms of their
agreement.93
Three issues complicate an easy resolution. First is the intergov-
ernmental nature of the compacts. Tribal gaming law represents an
intricate web of federal and state law, made even more complex by
tribal government sovereignty. Maintaining the sovereign rights of
each governmental body while simultaneously meeting each of their
needs is extraordinarily difficult; additionally, it can be difficult to
parse out whose laws control. Further, some issues involve the state
and tribes, others tribes and tribes, and yet others tribes and outside
private interests, such as the card room owners who also hope to gain
the right to conduct Class III gaming.
Second is the difficulty of striking compromises among Califor-
nia's more than one hundred tribal governments. 9 4 For example, the
needs of tribes that have as many as two thousand slot machines are
very different from those of tribes without casinos, or remote gaming
tribes with casinos capable of supporting only a small handful of ma-
chines. Thus, tribes occasionally conflict over which solutions will pro-
vide the best outcome for tribal members. Such dissention weakens
the strength tribes have when working in sync as a united force.
A third unique problem is the ironic alliance of the outside inter-
ests that comprise their foes. These include California card rooms and
Nevada casinos-who dread the competition from tribal casinos-and
anti-gaming groups, who would like to eliminate gambling entirely.
The power of these entities should not be underestimated, as they
93. See discussion infra Part II.B.
94. See James May, Two Years After California's Proposition IA, Indian Gaming Still Faces
Controversy, INMIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Mar. 13, 2002 (quoting tribal gaming consultant
Michael Lombardi as saying "[i]t's almost impossible to get California tribes to unite or
agree about anything," and explaining how the Spanish, American and Mexican govern-
ments have historically exploited inter-tribal conflict for their own purposes), http://in-
diancountry.com/?1015866292 (last visited Mar. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Two Years After].
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include some of the wealthiest corporations and individuals in the
nation. 95
While several lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of Pro-
position 1A have already been filed and dismissed, 96 others are pend-
ing.97 Even if these latter suits are similarly dismissed, more are sure to
follow: There is too much at stake-for the tribes, for states, for pri-
vate gaming interests, and for California voters-to avoid yet another
fight.
A. Model Compact Ambiguities
Several text-based ambiguities within the compact must be clari-
fied so that tribes and the state can appropriately and effectively fulfill
the agreement's mandated requirements. These ambiguities have pri-
marily focused on two provisions: the maximum number of slot ma-
chines authorized in-state, 98 and the regulation of revenue sharing, 99
as discussed below.
1. Slot Machine Maximums
One of the most publicized and criticized of the Proposition 1A
compact provisions has been the complicated formula used to deter-
mine the maximum number of slot machines authorized in Califor-
nia.100 Soon after the model compact's ratification, tribes and the
95. See, e.g., Court Rebuffs Pataki In Suit Over Gambling, Gambling Magazine, at http://
www.gamblingmagazine.com/articles/29/29-343.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2002) (discuss-
ing Donald Trump's involvement in fighting the approval of tribal casinos in New York).
96. See, e.g., May, Gambling Control Commission, supra note 91.
97. For example, recent lawsuits have claimed that giving tribes exclusive rights to
Class III gaming violates the Equal Protection clause of the United States Constitution.
California tribes have responded that the exception for tribes is not based on ethnicity,
which would potentially implicate Equal Protection, but on tribes' government status, and
thus is consistent with California's lottery provision (which allows the state to generate
funds for government use) and its charitable gaming exception (which allows non-profits
to conduct bingo games). See Don Thompson, Court Decision Could Undermine Tribal Gam-
bling, Bar First Urban Casino, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 16, 2001, http://www.sacbee.com/
static/live/news/calreport/N2001-11-16-1645-2.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter Court Decision] (discussing card room operators' and gambling opponents' claim that
the Proposition LA amendment provides tribes with a Congressionally unintended monop-
oly on Class III gaming). While Judge David F. Levi of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of California recently resolved this issue in favor of tribes, the card
rooms are already threatening to appeal. See Thomas Peele, State Pacts with Tribes Within
Law, Judge Says, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, July 30, 2002, http://www.bayarea.com/mld/bay
area/news/3762444.htm (last visited July 30, 2002).
98. See Tribal-State Gaming Compact, supra note 27, at § 4.3.2.2.
99. See id. at § 4.3.2.1.
100. For a detailed description of the formula used, see id. at § 4.3.
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state found themselves in the awkward position of disagreeing as to
exactly how many machines had been approved. 10 1 While the gover-
nor has traditionally asserted that the maximum statewide allotment is
45,206 machines, 10 2 the Legislative Analyst's Office has estimated that
the number actually allowed may be as high as 113,000.103 Tribes simi-
larly contend that the governor's maximum is too conservative. 1 0 4
Finalizing a concrete number has been complicated even further
by the compact's slot machine sharing plan, 10 5 which enables tribes
with large casinos to lease non-gaming and smaller tribes' allotments.
Such leases enable remote tribes to benefit financially from their allot-
ment, even if they never operate casinos. They also allow tribes with
larger casinos to maximize profits by enabling them to put into play a
greater number of machines than the per tribe 2000 machine cap
(and thereby add additional net revenue to the tribal revenue sharing
fund discussed below, maximizing the net proceeds that can be dis-
tributed to nongaming tribes). 106 Because slot machines are extraordi-
narily lucrative, but the state wants to cap the total number in play to
limit the spread of gambling, the number permitted will continue to
be a major issue when compact renegotiations begin in March
2003.107
2. Revenue Sharing
Conflict has also arisen regarding tribes' eligibility for revenue
sharing funds and whether tribes can be required to share their pro-
ceeds with other tribes. 108 The revenue sharing funds consist of a pool
of money generated by gaming tribes for allocation to non-gaming
tribes. 10 9 The tribal-state compact expressly provides up to $1.1 mil-
101. See Kevin Yamamura, State's Slot Machines on the Rise: Indian Casinos Have More Than
Doubled Number to 40,833, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 27, 2001, at A3.
102. This number was updated to 51,306 in June 2002 when the State Gambling Con-
trol Commission issued additional licenses (however, only about 41,000 are currently in
use). See Bettina Boxall, Tribes Granted More Slot Licenses, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 2002, http://
www.latimes.com/news/local/la-000043678jun22.story (last visited June 22, 2002).
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See Tribal-State Gaming Compact, supra note 27, at § 4.3.2.2.
106. See id.
107. See Yamamura, supra note 101. The Proposition IA compact provides that tribes
and the state can amend the terms of the compact beginning in March 2003. See discussion
infra Part II.B.
108. See Two Years After, supra note 94.
109. See Tribal-State Gaming Compact, supra note 27, at § 5.0.
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lion for each non-gaming and eligible gaming tribe.110 Non-gaming
tribes include those that will never be able to offer gaming because
their reservations are not located in or near population areas that can
support the industry."1 The compact defines "eligible tribes" as those
having fewer than 350 slot machines.' 1 2 However, both definitions are
somewhat vague. For example, they do not recognize issues of federal
status, a lack of which has often excluded many tribal members from
obtaining federal support.113
Revenue sharing eligibility has been an area where tribes conflict
with each other, threatening the unified front that was crucial to the
tribes' success in passing Proposition IA. Because the fund represents
a limited pool, tribes vie with one another for revenue, creating a
built-in incentive to limit the number of tribes found eligible. For ex-
ample, if the funds flowing into the pool are not enough to pay each
eligible tribe the full $1.1 million, then whatever funds are available
are split evenly among those tribes. 114 Consequently, the greater the
number of eligible tribes, the less each eligible tribe may be
110. See Tribal-State Gaming Compact, supra note 27, at § 4.3.2.1. This provision has
the dual role of ensuring a certain dollar amount for tribes, and providing an incentive to
limit the number of tribes that actually go into gaming (acting as a win-win for remote
tribes and the state).
111. See California Indians Past and Present, supra note 6 (stating that most California
tribes "will never achieve self-sufficiency through gaming because of the sparse population
base around the reservations to which tribes were assigned," due to California's nineteenth
century policy of opposing any law that enabled Indians to retain or obtain land that might
prove of value). Other economic opportunities currently pursued by California tribes in-
clude natural resource development, retail sales, manufacturing, recycling and sanitary
landfill operations. See generally website, Alliance of California Tribes, supra note 6. While
anti-gaming interests may argue such operations can be utilized in place of gaming, imple-
menting these industries requires a huge initial influx of capital which most tribes do not
have. For many tribes, it is gaming that has provided the necessary revenue to effectively
initiate such industries on tribal land, and provided the basis for economic development
and diversification.
112. See Tribal-State Gaming Compact, supra note 27, at § 4.3.2(a) (i).
113. The federal government does not recognize all Indian tribes as legitimate. It has
also regularly underestimated the number of tribal members who live in the United States.
For example, the Bureau of Indian Affairs has traditionally determined Indian populations
by counting only those individuals who live on or near reservations. See Carole Goldberg-
Ambrose and Duane Champagne, A Second Century of Dishonor: Federal Inequities and Califor-
nia Tribes, Alliance of California Tribes Website, at http://www.allianceofcatribes.org/re-
port.htm (last visited June 29, 2002) (arguing that "the Bureau of Indian Affairs should
eliminate its strict adherence to the 'on or near reservation' requirement, and should
count all members of [even] unrecognized tribes who meet eligibility standards under the
1988 amendments to the Indian Health Care Improvement Act," to ensure that as many
tribal members as possible are counted, to maximize funding and service to such groups
(emphasis added)).
114. See Tribal-State Gaming Compact, supra note 27, at § 5.0.
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awarded. 1 5 Although $1.1 million may not seem like significant fund-
ing for government operations, it can make a critical impact on tribal
education, housing, and economic diversification, 1 6 especially for
tribes with relatively few members. Since smaller and poorer tribes
comprise the majority of those vying for funds, the stakes involved are
especially high.
The Commission's revenue sharing distribution process has also
been criticized.1 1 7 For example, several tribes and the state have bat-
tled over which government bodies (state or tribal) have the right to
allocate slot machines.1 18 Further, some tribes have criticized the
state's initial delay in distributing funds to needy reservations, as well
as the ways in which the state may have used its control of the funds to
force the unnecessary disclosure of privileged tribal information,
thereby infringing on tribal sovereignty.11 9 Conversely, the govern-
ment has complained that it was the tribes' lack of compliance with
contributing to the revenue-sharing pool that was the primary bar to
speedy implementation. 120 The effect of this power struggle has been
to exacerbate distrust between some gaming tribes and the state.
12
'
B. Renegotiation Clauses and the "Most Favored Tribe" Provision
Clauses within the compact that allow for its modification have
the potential to significantly impact tribes' and the state's ability to
restrict or expand the scope of gaming in California. Generally speak-
ing, there are two such clauses inherent to the compact: 1) a renegoti-
ation provision; and 2) a "most favored tribe" provision.
115. For example, if the revenue sharing pool has a value of twenty million dollars and
there are twenty-five eligible tribes, each would be awarded $800,000. But if there are only
twenty eligible tribes, each would be awarded one million dollars. This theoretically creates
an incentive for tribes to fight against the eligibility of others. See id. at § 4.3.2.1. (explain-
ing how revenue sharing funds are to be allotted).
116. Other economic opportunities currently pursued by California tribes include nat-
ural resource development, retail sales, manufacturing, recycling and sanitary landfill oper-
ations. See generally website, Alliance of California Tribes, supra note 6. While anti-gaming
interests may argue such operations can be utilized in place of gaming, undertaking these
industries requires a huge initial influx of capital which most tribes do not have. For many
tribes, it is gaming that has provided the necessary revenue to effectively initiate such in-
dustries on tribal land, and provided the basis for economic development and
diversification.
117. See May, Gambling Control Commission, supra note 91.
118. See Sweeney, supra note 107. See also Boxall, supra note 102.
119. See Sweeney, supra note 107.
120. See id.
121. See id.
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The tribal-state compact's "renegotiation" clause reserves the
right of both a signatory tribe and the state to amend the agreement
at any time after March 7, 2003, so long as both parties agree. 122 This
clause provides a three year trial period to determine the effectiveness
of the compact's provisions, and imbues the agreement with flexibility
so that any unmet needs can later be addressed.
Under the compact's "most favored tribe"12 3 provision, if the gov-
ernor enters into an agreement with any tribe that is more favorable
than the model compact, the state must adopt the preferred agree-
ment for all tribes.124 Thus, this provision leaves open the possibility
of gaming expansion by enabling replacement of existing compact
provisions with ones more favorable to the tribes.' 2 5
While these provisions provide much-needed flexibility, they have
also acted as a source of concern for anti-gaming interests and of un-
certainty for tribes and the state. 126
C. The "Monopoly" and "Equal Protection" Issues
Monopoly and equal protection criticisms have been, and con-
tinue to be, the most powerful weapons in the arsenal of anti-tribal
gaming interests-especially since they have ensnared the attention of
the press.' 27 Both have resulted in several lawsuits, and even contrib-
uted to a temporary freeze on tribal slot machine licensing. 28
Proposition 1A opponents argue that a constitutional amend-
ment that exempts tribes (and only tribes) from California's ban on
Las Vegas-style gaming 129 establishes an unconstitutional race-based
classification. 130 Proposition 1A advocates counter that the exception
122. See Tribal-State Gaming Compact, supra note 27, at § 4.3.3.
123. See id. at § 15.4 (defining a most favored tribe as "any other tribe that contains
more favorable provisions with respect to any provisions of [the] Compact").
124. See id.
125. For example, if the governor were to compact with even one tribe to permit a
maximum of 2500 machines, the 2000 per tribe maximum would disappear, and be re-
placed with the more tribal-friendly maximum.
126. See Boxall, supra note 102 (asserting the need for the meaning of the compact's
language to be clarified during renegotiations in March 2003).
127. See, e.g., Lawsuit, supra note 92.
128. See Two Years After, supra note 94. See also Lawsuit Threatens California Indian Gam-
ing, AZCENTRAL.COM: APIZONA'S HOME PAGE, Nov. 16, 2001, www.azcentral.com/azc-
bin/print.php3 (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
129. See Tribal-State Gaming Compact, supra note 27, at § E.
130. See Court Decision, supra note 97.
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is based on a government status, a legitimate classification, and not
race. 
131
This same provision has been characterized as anti-competitive,
with California card rooms arguing that the tribes' exclusive right to
provide slot machines constitutes a monopoly on gambling in-state,
contrary to Congress's intent.132
D. The Legality of California's Special Distribution Fund
The California compact mandates that gaming tribes contribute
to a special distribution fund.133 Unlike the revenue sharing fund
which benefits tribes, the special distribution fund provides revenue
to off-set state expenses relevant to tribal gaming. 13 4 However, it also
provides that a portion of the monies be spent on "any other purposes
specified by the Legislature."' 1 5 This stipulation may conflict with fed-
eral law, as IGRA expressly limits states' abilities to "impose any tax,
fee, charge, or other assessment upon an Indian tribe...,"136 beyond
that needed to off-set the state's costs in regulating tribal gaming. 13 7
Several tribes have also argued that this clause is an illegal infringe-
ment on tribal sovereignty, noting that no other governments are
compelled to fund other governments' programs (for example, Cali-
fornia citizens cannot be forced to pay for Texas programs, and vice
versa).
E. Reservation Boundaries
One of the most significant hurdles for tribes and the state will be
figuring out how to allow for reasonable growth and place legal limits
on gaming expansion, without compromising their respective sover-
eignty. This will require articulating the scope of reservation bounda-
ries, including landless tribes' ability to have land taken into trust.
This debate has primarily focused on potential tribal casino expansion
131. See May, Gambling Control Commission, supra note 91. See also ArtichokeJoe's v. Nor-
ton, No. CIV-S-01-0248 DFL GGH (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2002), available at http://207.41.18.
73/caed/staticOther/page1509.htm (affirming that tribes' exclusive gambling rights are
based on government status, not race).
132. See Court Decision, supra note 97.
133. See Tribal-State Gaming Compact, supra note 27, at § 5.0 (describing the special
distribution fund and the percent of net slot machine revenue to be contributed by each
gaming tribe).
134. See id. at § 5.2(a).
135. See id.
136. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(4) (2001) (applying only to Class III gaming).
137. See id. at § 2710(d) (3) (C) (iii).
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into urban and suburban communities, which creates competition for
existing card rooms 138 and arguably threatens the character of subur-
ban communities. 13 9
One especially publicized boundary issue involves the ability of
tribes to acquire formerly private urban card rooms, take them into
trust as tribal property, and convert them into full-blown Indian casi-
nos. This type of expansion has been the focus of the Lytton Band of
Pomo Indians' recent (and vehemently contested) efforts to purchase
an urban card room in Contra Costa County. 1 40
The Lytton tribe has also experienced a negative backlash due to
state citizens' fear of suburban "invasion." Such concerns have im-
pacted the tribe's efforts to purchase fifty acres in Sonoma County to
replace the Sonoma reservation they lost years ago.14 1 Neighbors are
138. California card rooms are privately owned casinos that are limited to providing
Class I and Class II games. See Hotel Employees, 981 P.2d at 1004 (describing card rooms as
casinos "not permitted to offer gaming activities in the form of: (1) lotteries; (2) banking
games, whether or not played with cards; (3) percentage games, whether or not played
with cards; (4) slot machines; or (5) games proscribed by name, including twenty-one" as
prohibited by statute).
139. Another current "boundary" issue is Internet gaming. While the complexities of
on-line gambling law is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is important to note that the
Internet provides considerable potential for the expansion of gambling, tribal or other-
wise. With respect to Internet gaming, the compact says only that "the Tribe will not offer
such games through use of the Internet unless others in the state are permitted to do so
under state and federal law." Tribal-State Gaming Compact, supra note 27, at § 4.1(c).
Until federal Internet gambling law is clarified, this compact provision potentially leaves
room for further growth, and thus further contention.
140. See, e.g., Henry K. Lee, Second Suit Filed to Stop Takeover of Casino by Tribe: Competitors
Try to Stop Lytton Band in San Pablo, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 15, 2001, at A4.
141. The story of tribal land-loss in California is especially vicious. Tribes lost a first
wave of land during the gold rush era, during which settlers often took tribal lands by
force, sometimes by murdering tribal members to secure settlement claims. A policy of
genocide further decimated the California tribal population, effectuating its plummet
from 150,000 to an estimated low of 20,000 men, women and children. Between 1851 and
1852, the United States federal government signed eighteen treaties with California Indi-
ans, which, if ratified, would have reserved more than eight million acres in-state as tribal
land. However, the California State Senate and governor opposed any agreements that
could potentially preclude non-Indian access to lands that might be either farmable or rich
in gold. Accordingly, the United States Senate secretly rejected the eighteen treaties. To
add further insult, tribal members were rounded up, often regardless of family units, and
exiled to reservations. Another wave of land loss (representing more than ninety million
acres) took place during the United States' official policy of assimilation around the turn
of the twentieth century. A final blow was dealt in 1958 with the passage of California's
Rancheria Act, which "terminated" thirty-eight tribes, moving their lands into alternate
ownership. Because of these violations, California Indians now own less than one-fifth of
the land per capita than that owned by tribal members elsewhere in the nation. See Califor-
nia Indians Past and Present, supra note 6.
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concerned that once the tribe owns the land it will build a casino in-
stead of housing.
The landless United Auburn Indian Community's efforts to se-
cure property for a casino just outside of Sacramento have also gar-
nered significant press attention. 142 United Auburn is relying on an
exception to the IGRA provision that limits tribes to operating casinos
on land owned prior to October 1988. This exception permits tribes
to conduct gaming on land acquired more recently only if approved
by the Secretary of the Interior, and then only if the Secretary sees
proceeding as a potential benefit for both the tribe and the surround-
ing community. 143 Casino operators in Reno "view the [potential
United Auburn] casino as perhaps their biggest competitor among
the tribal casinos built or pending in Northern California," 144 and
thus have ardently contested such approval.
An additional, related issue has recently emerged: In June, Cali-
fornia Attorney General Bill Lockyer released his preliminary finding
that land owned by the Dry Creek Pomo tribe in Sonoma County does
not qualify as a reservation for gaming purposes, stating that the fed-
eral government technically holds the land in "fee" as opposed to "in
trust." The tribe counters that such specific wording should not be
determinative, and that the land, for all extents and purposes, is held
in trust.145 The final outcome of this issue will have radical implica-
tions for tribes nationwide. 146
Lawsuits have now been filed by anti-tribal gaming interests to
stop pending property acquisitions. 147 Ultimately, the publicity gener-
ated by these cases threatens tribal rights by playing on citizens' worst
142. See Dave Berns, Lawyer Will Keep Fighting California Casino Project, LAS VEGAS REv. J.
(Feb. 15, 2002), at http://www.lvj.com/cgi-bin/printable.cgi?/v-home/2002/Feb-15-
2002/business/18105589.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2002).
143. See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b) (1) (B) (2001).
144. Don Thompson, Interior Department Says it Will Approve Sacramento-Area Casino, SAC-
RAMENTo BEE (Feb. 13, 2002), at www.sacbee.com/content/news/story/1628259p-
1704605e.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Interior Department].
145. See Sam Kennedy, Lockyer: Pomo Casino May Be Illegal, PRESS DEMOCRAT (June 7,
2002), at http://www.pressdemo.com/local/news/07casino-aI.html (last visited June 22,
2002).
146. Tribal gaming has its greatest support in those parts of the state that have the
highest concentration of tribal casinos. For example, while seventy-eight percent of Califor-
nians support Indian gaming as a means for tribal self-sufficiency, eighty percent of survey
participants in San Diego (which has seven casinos) concur, but only sixty-eight percent of
Sacramento survey-takers feel similarly. See Lombardi III, supra note 85.
147. See Court Decision, supra note 97. As a result of these controversies, the Bureau of
the Interior rescinded its initial approval of the project (reinstating it a few days later). See
Summer 2002] PROPOSITION IA
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
fear: that tribal casinos will be able to expand limitlessly, penetrating
both urban and suburban communities. 148
III. Solutions
A. Text-based Ambiguities
One of the first and simplest ways to secure the permanency of
the tribal-state compacts will be for the state and tribes to quickly, ef-
fectively and permanently resolve any disagreement as to the specific
meaning of the compact's provisions. Ideally, this should be com-
pleted prior to or during compact negotiations in March 2003. Once
such discrepancies are resolved, tribes and the state should utilize
public relations strategies to promote their unity. It is critical that they
not overlook the impact of public perception on political decision-
making. Once tribes and the state are in private and public agree-
ment, it will become much more difficult for anti-tribal gaming inter-
ests to drive a wedge between the state and tribes by drawing the
public's attention to any areas of dissension. Public clarification of any
ambiguities would also preclude anti-gaming interests from using fear
tactics to exacerbate voters' dread of an unchecked and unrealistic
spread of tribal gaming. Since California's tribal-state compacts in-
clude an extensive and detailed dispute resolution process, litigation-
based efforts to resolve such issues should be undertaken only as a last
resort, and, as directed by the compacts, solely in federal court.149
1. The Total Number of Machines Authorized
It should be noted that the ambiguity as to the total number of
machines allowed may actually create a much-needed and beneficial
flexibility. The compact's per tribe maximum, when combined with
California's supply and demand economy, may ultimately prove a
more effective means of imposing permanent limits on the prolifera-
tion of gambling than any arbitrary state-wide limit.
However, because differences in interpreting the total number of
machines permitted has been heavily publicized, tribes and the state
should come out with an "official" total, and thereby stem criticism
148. See, id. (quoting Lidia Robinson, who argued for tribal casinos being "[p]ut...
out in the middle of nowhere").
149. See Tribal-State Gaming Compact, supra note 27, at § 9.0. Because the compact
mandates that any dispute first be adjudicated through a specific dispute resolution pro-
cess, California overstepped the boundaries of its own agreement when it went through the
court system to obtain an injunction against the sale of additional slot machine licenses. See
id. (detailing the compact dispute resolution process).
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over their disagreement. A specific number and a united front should
also help assuage voters' fears of unlimited gaming expansion.
While opponents have criticized the model compact's ambiguity
as to the total number of machines authorized, contending this makes
a significant difference in the impact of gaming in-state, 150 this fear is
unfounded: A statewide cap does exist.1 51 First, the compact mandates
a statewide limit of 2000 machines per tribe. When this number is
multiplied by the 109 tribes in-state, a concrete figure of 218,000 is
derived that leaves little room for ambiguity. While lease-sharing
agreements are permitted between tribes, allowing some tribal casinos
to install more than the 2000 per tribe slot machine maximum, such
leases do not impact the total number of machines in play since the
licenses merely reallocate use. 152 A second figure can also be gener-
ated by multiplying the 2000 machine cap by the estimated number of
tribes located in areas capable of supporting on-reservation gaming.
This number should be publicized in conjunction with the first, as the
more "realistic" maximum. Ultimately, these two ceiling numbers of-
fer a baseline by which tribes, the state, and the Office of the Legisla-
tive Analyst can resolve related textual ambiguities. 1
53
2. Revenue Sharing Payouts
Tribes and the state's gaming commission must expressly deline-
ate which tribes are entitled to revenue sharing disbursements. A
broad approach to eligibility may ultimately prove most effective.
Since tribal gaming generates significant revenue and recent casino
expansion indicates that such income will continue to grow, it is prob-
able that the funds generated will ultimately prove sufficient to pro-
vide every non-gaming and otherwise eligible tribe with the maximum
150. See I. Nelson Rose, The Gaming Industry: Current Legal, Regulatory, and Social Issues,
SF89 ALI-ABA 217, 220 (2001).
151. See Tribal-State Gaming Compact, supra note 27, at § 4.3.
152. Such leases make sense from a free market perspective: They enable larger tribal
casinos to maximize revenue, put much-needed capital into the hands of non-gaming
tribes in the form of lease payments, and ultimately contribute a maximum amount of
capital to the compact's revenue sharing and state distribution funds. The alternative is to
"waste" those machines on tribes that cannot use them, and thereby hinder tribes based in
remote areas from benefiting economically from their allotment.
153. See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE ANALYSIS OF THE 2001-2002 BUDGET BILL, CALI-
FORNIA GAMBLING CONTROL COMMISSION (0885), F-45-F-46 (2001). According to the Legis-
lative Analyst's Office ("LAO"), the office provides fiscal and policy advice to the California
State Legislature to ensure the California's executive branch of government implements
legislative policy effectively and in a manner that is cost efficient. See website, Legislative
Analyst's Office, at http://www.lao.ca.gov/laofacts.html (last visited July 28, 2002).
PROPOSITION IASummer 2002]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
$1.1 million allotment.1 5 4 A broad approach to eligibility would pro-
vide a win-win situation for both tribes and the state: Supporting the
broadest possible number of tribal members will reduce welfare de-
pendency for some of the state's neediest citizens, saving California
significant long-term revenue. It will also preserve sovereignty by en-
hancing tribes' ability to care for their constituents. Further, a tribal-
run body such as the California Nations Indian Gaming Association
should be permitted to play an active role in the fund's management
distribution, in order to avoid the types of mismanagement and dis-
sension that continue to plague non-tribal entities such as the Bureau
of Indian Affairs.155
B. Renegotiation Clauses
Anti-tribal gaming interests argue that the model compact's rene-
gotiation provisions create a risk that tribes and the state will signifi-
cantly expand the scope of gaming. However, since California's
legislature and governor would have to authorize such expansion and
they are elected bodies who remain accountable to the public, it is
unlikely this will happen. 156 Any major expansion will likely occur only
with express voter approval, in accord with the traditional checks and
balances of a democratic government.
Even the "most favored tribe" provision 15 7 may actually limit the
scope of gaming: Because the state is obligated to replace existing
compact terms with any preferred agreement, the state will be reluc-
154. This broad approach to eligibility mirrors the similarly broad approach to grant-
ing federal support recommended by Carole Goldberg-Ambrose and Duane Champagne
in their Report to Advisory Council on California Indian Policy. See Goldberg-Ambrose,
supra note 113.
155. For an overview of the Bureau's mismanagement of billions of dollars of tribal
funds, see the Native American Rights Fund Website, at http://www.narf.org/cases/iim.
html (last visited Aug. 11, 2002).
156. The power of politics has been evidenced by a freeze enacted by Governor Davis
in early 2002 regarding the granting of any new compacts. The freeze was instigated while
a lawsuit filed by California card rooms was pending. See Benjamin Spillman, Gaming Inter-
ests Watching Gubernatorial Race, DESERT SUN, Mar. 8, 2002, http://www.thedesertsun.com/
news/stories/business/1015562011.shtml. The freeze has temporarily contained the num-
ber of machines in-play across the state, which has been steadily creeping close to the
governor's stated limit. The freeze may also be a way for the governor to avoid the public
controversy that could erupt when the total number of machines in-play exceeds his limit.
He may consider this especially critical now, with the next gubernatorial election, slated for
November 2002, quickly approaching. But see id. (discussing a statement by the governor's
spokeswoman that the freeze is unrelated to the election, and was triggered solely by the
pending lawsuit).
157. See Tribal-State Gaming Compact, supra note 27, at § 15.4.
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tant to negotiate compacts that provide for expanded gaming provi-
sions with any tribe.
Finally, the renegotiation clauses act as safeguards for state citi-
zens: If tribes hope to expand the number of machines authorized,
any agreement on the part of the state will likely be qualified accord-
ing to the public's reaction as to how the agreements have worked so
far. An indirect form of political pressure thus ensures that it is in the
tribes' best interest to implement gaming in such a way as to most
benefit local communities.
Consequently, by working closely with local organizations, provid-
ing donations to nearby non-profits, and generating jobs for neigh-
boring communities, tribes can garner significant public interest in
the long-term viability of tribal casinos. This public interest can then
prove a major motivation for local representatives, who will be further
encouraged to support tribal casinos as providing a win-win for both
tribes and the state.' 58
C. The "Monopoly" and Equal Protection Issues
Tribal gaming opponents argue that California (and all states)
should not have the ability to exempt sovereign tribal nations from
generally applicable state gambling laws. They assert that Proposition
IA grants tribes a form of immunity from anti-competition require-
ments and establishes an unconstitutional preference for a select eth-
nic or racial group in violation of the United States Constitution.
Ruling that tribes' exclusive Class III gaming rights are unconsti-
tutional, however, would have serious and negative repercussions, not
only for tribes, but for the state. Ultimately, such a determination
threatens one of two results: First, if private gaming organizations
were allowed the same rights as tribes, California would be exposed to
a proliferation of private gaming. This result would be contrary to the
voters' intent of permitting gaming solely for tribal government pur-
poses. Second, if such non-profit gaming rights were barred, other
158. Survey results gathered by CNIGA and the First Nations Development Institute
indicate that many gaming tribes already use gaming revenue to donate generously to local
and state-wide charities, both to foster goodwill and benefit local organizations. The survey
found that tribal casinos, which represent fourteen percent of gambling institutions na-
tionwide, donated an estimated sixty-eight million dollars to charities in 1999. See Survey
Results of Indian Gaming Nation Charitable Gaming, at http://indiangaming.org/info/
survey.shtml (last visited Mar. 27, 2002). It should be noted that these figures do not ac-
count for the additional revenue tribal casinos bring into local communities in the form of
jobs and other economic stimulation, or the percent of tribal members that casino profits
have removed from welfare rolls. See id.
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provisions of the California constitution would also be placed at risk as
possible illegal monopolies, such as the gambling exception which
gives charities the right to conduct bingo for non-profit purposes.
Such a decision would also threaten the financial strength of the
state. If tribal gaming were eliminated, so too would be the millions of
dollars given to the state through the tribal-state compact's special dis-
tribution fund. Alternately, if tribal gaming rights were expanded to
private parties, the tribal-state compacts would be threatened, as such
funds may be dependent on tribal exclusivity for consideration (as dis-
cussed infra Part III.D.). 159
As for the Equal Protection issue, opening up gaming rights to
private parties misconstrues the classification under which tribes were
given their exclusive rights: as sovereign governments, not as a racial
or ethnic group. 161 Allowing tribes to own and operate casinos to raise
funds for government purposes such as the installation of housing,
electrical lines, water lines and fire hydrants, and is similar to the state
of California being allowed to conduct a lottery to generate revenue
for government purposes such as education. IGRA mandates that tri-
bal members can not operate casinos to generate funds for private
purposes. 61 Providing tribes with a constitutional exception to Cali-
fornia's anti-gambling laws is also consistent with those gaming excep-
tions already in the California constitution, which permit certain
forms of gaming exclusively for government or non-profit use (such as
the California lottery and charitable bingo provisions).162 Because one
hundred percent of tribal casino proceeds go directly to tribal govern-
ment coffers and not individuals, the distinction is based on the pur-
pose of the gaming and not the race of those involved. Since the
exclusivity granted tribes is therefore conditioned on government sta-
tus, private gaming interests can legally be denied Class III gaming
rights, and tribal exclusivity falls outside the parameters of Equal
Protection.
159. See Tribal-State Gaming Compact, supra note 27, at § 12.4. See generally Gatsby Con-
treras, Exclusivity Agreements in Tribal-State Compacts: Mutual Benefit Revenue-Sharing or Illegal
State Taxation?, 5J. GENDER RACE &JusT, 487 (2002) (debating the role of exclusivity agree-
ments in legalizing revenue sharing agreements between tribes and states).
160. See Artichoke Joe's, supra note 131, at 4-5.
161. Federal law under IGRA requires that all gaming proceeds, with very limited ex-
ceptions, be allocated for tribal government purposes only. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a) (1) (B)
(2001).
162. See CAL. CONST. of 1897, art. IV, § 19 (amended 2000).
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Further, gambling law has traditionally been left to state con-
trol,16 3and thus the federal judiciary should not abrogate that control.
This is especially true since doing so would directly contradict the Su-
preme Court's holding in Seminole, which asserted the states' freedom
from suit by private parties and the inability of the federal courts to
compel states to comply with Congressionally-mandated law.
164
Regardless, however, Proposition IA's opponents are trying to
use such arguments to undo Proposition 1A, by also utilizing the initi-
ative process: California card rooms and racetracks are relying on
their Equal Protection argument to try to secure expanded gambling
rights for private parties in the form of a Gambling Control Act. 16
5
This act is slated for the November 2002 California ballot. It would
authorize expanded table games and unlimited slot machines at all
California gaming establishments, tribal or private.166 Passing this act
would be a mistake, however, from the vantage point of both tribes
and the state. While it would appease private casino interests it would
controvert the general public's goal in passing Proposition IA: to al-
low for limited gambling on Indian reservations, to raise capital for
government purposes only.167 Consequently, the passage of such an
act is not the answer to ending current or future lawsuits, or simulta-
neously meeting the needs of California voters, tribal governments
and the state: Instead, it would merely change the function of gaming
from a means to raise funds for non-profit government purposes, to a
means of lining private pocketbooks.
D. Legality of California's Special Distribution Fund
Most of the compact's special distribution fund provisions do not
conflict with federal law as they provide for funding to off-set state
expenses initiated by tribal gaming, as expressly authorized by
IGRA. 168 However, the portion of the compact which allows funding
to go to "any other purposes" specified by the legislature potentially
violates IGRA's anti-tax provision. 169 The compact tries to avoid poten-
163. SeeJordan, supra note 60, at 457.
164. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
165. See Benjamin Spillman, Gambling Ballot Measure Sought, DESERT SUN (Dec. 28,
2001), at http://www.thedesertsun.com/news/stories/business/1009510440.shtml (last
visited Jan. 4, 2002).
166. See id.
167. See Lombardi III, supra note 85.
168. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (3) (C) (iii).
169. See Tribal-State Gaming Compact, supra note 27, at Preamble § 5.0. Section 5.0
stipulates that funds be distributed for five purposes: 1) grants for programs that fight
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tial illegality by expressly stating that revenue percentages were not
imposed as a condition to compact negotiations (which would be ex-
tortion), but as additional consideration paid by tribes in exchange
for an exclusive right to conduct Class III gaming.' 70 However, there is
a risk that courts will not agree that this express provision represents
the parties' true intent. It is possible that courts will eventually find
that the state's economic interest is the driving force behind tribal-
state compacting, and that it constitutes an illegal state "tax" of Indian
gaming. 71
Eliminating the compact's special distribution fund provision is
not a realistic solution, at least for now. It is this allocation of tribal
funding that gives California a direct financial interest in tribal gam-
ing, and therefore motivates the state to create and honor the tribal-
state compacts. By providing the state with a piece of tribal gaming
revenue, tribal casinos generate millions of dollars to offset state
budget shortages, and to fund special legislative projects. 172 Without
income from the special distribution fund, states would have signifi-
cantly less motivation to support tribes' efforts.' 73 Ultimately, percent-
age allocations, while unquestionably an imposition on tribal
sovereignty, are necessary to compel states to negotiate compacts post-
Seminole. The effect of fiscal incentives on existing agreements are al-
ready apparent, as with New York state's recent approval of six tribal
gambling addiction; 2) grants for government agencies affected by tribal gaming; 3) com-
pact implementation costs assumed by the State Gaming Agency and Department of Jus-
tice; 4) to compensate for a lack of funds in the Revenue Sharing Trust; and 5) "any other
purposes specified by the Legislature."
In California, the percent contribution mandated by Section 5.0 slides based on the
number of machines in operation; for example, tribes with 200 or fewer machines contrib-
ute nothing, while tribes with 201 to 500 machines contribute seven percent of their net,
and tribes with 501 to 1000 machines contribute ten percent for every machine over the
first 200. The cap is thirteen percent for all terminals over and above the first 1000.
170. See Tribal-State Gaming Compact, supra note 27, at Preamble § E.
171. See Contreras, supra note 159, at 493-499, 506-507.
172. Some suggest that there is a direct connection between the recent recession and
the sudden proliferation of compacting in the United States. At least twenty-two states are
currently considering approving or expanding tribal gaming as a means to at least partially
off-set the nationwide thirty-eight billion dollar budget shortfalls being faced by thirty-eight
states. A similar gaming explosion occurred during a recession in the early 1990s, leading
to an increase in riverboat gambling across the South and Midwest. SeeJoe Weinert, States
View Gambling as Quick Fix for Deficits, PRESS oF ATLANTIC CITY, Feb. 15, 2002, http://www.
pressplus.com/business-casino/103001NYCHALLENGES.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2002).
173. It is important to note that such funds do not represent the only financial benefit
provided by tribal gaming. Tribal casinos also employ thousands of workers, often in eco-
nomically depressed areas, and purchase supplies from retail and wholesale stores in their
surrounding communities. They also bring a customer base to relatively remote areas of
the state, simultaneously benefiting non-tribal businesses.
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casinos as part of a plan to generate income to offset costs associated
with the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center.174
Unless Congress or the United States Supreme Court takes action to
modify the impact of Seminole, Congress will have to modify IGRA to
permit the allocation clauses, or, better yet, provide official commen-
tary that allows for percent clauses as contractual consideration for
exclusive gaming rights.175 This could be done by codifying the De-
partment of Interior's as-of-now "informal policy" that "allow[s] states
to claim a portion of gambling revenues [as long as the state] offers
tribes . . . 'substantial exclusivity' over gambling."176 A federally-re-
quired cap on any garnered percent would help limit the infringe-
ment on tribal sovereignty, and ensure that percent clauses truly
operate as consideration. Ideally, state and tribal governments should
secure an arrangement that maximizes benefits for the greatest num-
ber of people, but adheres to the greatest possible deference to tribal
sovereignty.177
E. Reservation Boundaries
IGRA and other expressions of tribal gaming law reveal that vot-
ers' fear of an unmitigated expansion of tribal casinos into urban and
suburban areas is mostly unrealistic. Thus, it is critical that California's
judicial, executive and legislative bodies clarify that significant urban
and suburban casino expansion is largely a non-issue, so that casinos
can continue to provide social and fiscal benefits for their communi-
ties. Ultimately, the federal and state governments should allow local
government compromises to control (such as the deals negotiated be-
tween Lytton and the city of San Pablo), since such negotiations bal-
174. See Carolyn Thompson, N.Y Gambling Plan Becomes Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 31,
2001, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wo-dyn/articles/A19490-2001Oct31.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 31, 2001). Funds from New York's recent agreements are expected to raise one
billion dollars over the next three years to help defray costs from the world trade center
collapse. See Tony Batt, supra note 11.
175. See Contreras, supra note 159, at 510-11.
176. Id. at 506 (discussing former Department of Interior Secretary Babbit's policy
statement advocating the allowance of revenue sharing agreements between tribes and
states, despite IGRA's anti-tax provision, if such agreements are conditioned on the main-
tenance of substantial exclusivity). Under this approach, the exclusivity granted tribes is
viewed as contractual consideration for the state's financial interest. Id.
177. While it will not be easy to find a solution suitable for all of the country's more
than five hundred tribal governments, it is imperative that tribal governments be repre-
sented at all levels of decision making, to maintain tribal sovereignty. In the long run, such
a partnership will do more to secure a permanent solution than any fix asserted solely by
the legislature or the courts.
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ance the competing and complementary needs of local tribes and
surrounding neighborhoods.
The true scope of the tribal-state compacts and any relevant law
must be publicized, to lessen local opposition and relieve the fear of
unmitigated expansion. Under federal law, tribes are bound to con-
duct IGRA-regulated gaming only on lands possessed prior to October
17, 1988.178 There are only four general exceptions to this rule: 1) if
lands fall within or are contiguous to a reservation's boundaries; 179 2)
if the tribe had no reservation as of October 17, 1988 and the land
falls within the tribe's last recognized reservation; 180 3) if the Secretary
of the Interior and local officials determine that permitting a gaming
establishment would be in the best interest of the tribe's members and
would not negatively impact surrounding communities (in which case
approval from the governor of that state is also needed); 1" or 4) if
lands are taken into trust for the tribe for additional consideration,
such as to settle a land claim, or restore prior tribal property. 182
Because of these severe restrictions, the Lytton and United Au-
burn tribes' inroads into urban areas promise to be relatively isolated.
The Lytton tribe's success in having an urban card room taken into
trust represents an almost freak occurrence.18 3 A rider on an act that
was approved by Congress in 2000 allowed the card room to be de-
clared tribal property even though it did not belong to the tribe prior
to the October 1988 cut off date.' 8 4 This was only made possible be-
cause the tribe's land had been terminated decades earlier. 1'85 And
even the incredible hurdle of getting a special act passed by Congress
has not ensured that a casino will be built. The tribe will still need to
secure a compact from the governor before it can operate any Class
III games on site.'8 6 Further, if the tribe chooses to work with a profes-
sional casino development and management company to get the ca-
sino up and running, it will have to secure additional approval from
178. See 25 U.S.C. § 2719 (2001).
179. See id. at § 2719(a) (1).
180. See id. at § 2719(a) (2) (B).
181. See id. at § 2719(b) (1) (A).
182. See id. at § 2719(b)(1)(B).
183. See John M. Glionna, Land Part of Cultural Roots, Tribe Says, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2002, at BI.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id.
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NIGA, which regulates such agreements to ensure that tribal govern-
ments, and not private interests, most benefit.18 7
The only reason Lytton has managed to obtain the assistance
needed to get as far as it has is because of the tremendous support it
has received from the city of San Pablo, where the card room is lo-
cated. 188 In addition to the estimated one hundred and fifty million
dollars it would generate for the relatively impoverished city,'8 9 an-
other argument in favor of the deal may actually be its urban setting:
Since cities already contain card rooms, tribal casinos may be less
likely to change the character of the surrounding community, than in
more rural neighborhoods.1 90
The United Auburn situation, which was made possible by IGRA's
land into trust exception, 191 has also progressed as far as it has only
because of support from the county in which their casino would be
located. 192 As stated in an article in the Sacramento Bee that partially
quotes Interior Secretary for Indian Affairs Neal McCalab, "the tribe's
agreement with Placer County is a model for how the department
would like to see tribes operate-'by using consultation, cooperation,
[and] communication all in the service of conservation."'193 Such "co-
operation" has included a promise by the tribe to compensate for any
lost local property taxes, to donate nine hundred thousand dollars
annually for police, fire and emergency services, to pay fifty thousand
dollars for efforts to fight compulsive gambling, and to establish an
advisory committee as a forum for community feedback.194
Ultimately, since IGRA and other federal laws have made land
acquisition a long and difficult process, have required agreement on
the part of states, and have limited gaming on newly acquired lands to
tribes that had no reservation prior to October 1988, the potential for
187. Another safeguard against tribal governments being a "front" for private gaming
companies (in addition to the tribe's sovereignty and monetary interests) is IGRA, which
limits the amount of time a professional, non-tribal management company can be involved
in the operation of Indian casinos.
188. See Interior Department, supra note 144.
189. See Glionna, supra note 183, at BI.
190. It should be noted that even the impact of tribal casinos on rural neighborhoods
can be mitigated with the use of architectural styles that draw on the surrounding environ-
ment, or by incorporating industries traditionally welcomed by the local communities,
such as health spas in Sonoma County.
191. SeeJeff Simpson, Decision Expected Soon on California Tribal Casino, LAS VEGAS R. J.
(Feb. 2, 2002), http://www.lvrj.com/lvrj-home/2002/Feb-02-Sat-2002/business/18010330.
html (last visited Feb. 2, 2002).
192. See Interior Department, supra note 144.
193. Id.
194. See Court Decision, supra note 130.
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acquiring suburban and urban property for Indian gaming is extraor-
dinarily limited. As attorney Joseph Kelly, co-editor of Gaming Law
Review, has stated, the process is "one of the most difficult things on
Earth."'195 While two tribes in the state are working to overcome such
hurdles, the process has been long and difficult, and will most likely
discourage tribes that would have even less chance for success.
Conclusion
California's tribes and voters had one primary goal with the pas-
sage of Proposition IA: to empower tribes to maximize their self-suffi-
ciency. 196 However, ambiguous tribal-state compact provisions and
continued misperceptions about the potential scope of Indian gaming
threaten the significant fiscal and social benefits Proposition IA has
helped secure for tribal and California communities. Further, any de-
cision that overturns Proposition IA would ensure that the will of the
people-who are themselves a legislative force 197-has been violated
not only once, but twice. 198 Consequently, it is critical that the state
and tribes work together, quickly and efficiently, to resolve all com-
pact ambiguities, and face the public with a united front. The prece-
dent set now is critical not only to California, but to the nation as a
whole: The resolution of these issues will provide a model for other
states to follow as they provide for Indian gaming within their
borders. 199
Ultimately, it is within California citizens' and the state's best in-
terest to ensure tribal gaming is maintained. The economic and social
stakes are extremely high. The comments of Lytton Tribal Chairwo-
man Margie Mejia seem especially representative: "I wish we didn't
have to run a casino to buy this land... [b]ut you tell me what other
way a tribe with no assets can make that kind of money."200 For many,
gaming seems a lesser evil than the extreme poverty and resultant de-
195. Joe Weinert, New York Casino Proposal Still Faces Many Obstacles, Press Plus: The
Press of Atlantic City Online (Oct. 30, 2001), at http://www.pressplus.com/business-ca-
sino/103001NYCHALLENGES.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2001).
196. See Lombardi IlI, supra note 85.
197. See Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union v. Davis, 981 P.2d 990, 1011
(Cal. 1999) (Kennard, J., dissenting).
198. Proposition 5, which also evidenced the public's support for tribal gaming as a
means for self-sufficiency, was repealed following the California Supreme Court's decision
in Hotel Employees. The proposition had been approved by state citizens by a landslide sixty-
three percent. See Lombardi I, supra note 3.
199. More than twenty states are currently considering facilitating the implementation
or expansion of tribal gaming within their borders. See Weinart, supra note 198.
200. Glionna, supra note 183.
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spair, low self-esteem, high suicide rates and poor health conditions
that still plague many tribal nations. And ultimately, once such signifi-
cant change has come, there can be no going back to the conditions
of the past. As the Native American Indian Strong Eyes once stated
under much bleaker conditions, "We can't go back. The bridge is
gone." 201
Gaming not only benefits tribal members, but non-gaming Indi-
ans and general populations, as well. By providing per capita revenue
as well as funds to develop an economic infrastructure on tribal reser-
vations, Proposition IA compacts and the tribal casinos they support
have made a significant impact on the California economy. Tribal
gaming has generated thousands ofjobs;20 2 created a market for local
suppliers;20 3 raised revenue to benefit local charities;20 4 helped re-
move members of both gaming and non-gaming tribes from welfare
rolls; 20 5 generated millions of dollars in state and federal taxes;206 pro-
vided schools for tribal youth;20 7 and reinvested in local communi-
ties.208 But perhaps even more importantly, the survival of the
Proposition IA constitutional amendment will maintain something
even more precious than financial benefits: the faith of all California
citizens-tribal and otherwise-in a democracy that ensures that this
time, their voices will be heard.
201. Hifler, supra note 1, at 105.
202. See Questions and Answers, supra note 43.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See Brenda Norrell, American Indians Celebrate Winning in New Mexico, at http://
www.pechanga.net/documents/americanindians_celebratewhni.html (last visited Dec.
12, 2001).
208. See Questions and Answers, supra note 43.
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